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Summary  findings
Zaman examines the extent to which micro-credit  contributing to female empowerment. The reduction in
reduces poverty and vulnerability through a case study of  female vulnerability in a patriarchal society is illustrated
BRAC, one of the largest providers of micro-credit to the  using 16 female empowerment  indicators developed
poor  in Bangladesh. Household  consumption data  from data on 1,568 women. The results suggest that
collected from 1,072 households is used to show that the  micro-credit's greatest impact is on the set of indicators
largest effect on poverty arises when a moderate-poor  relating to female control over assets and knowledge of
BRAC loanee borrows more that 10,000 taka (US$200)  social issues.
in cumulative loans. Different control groups and  The author also argues that micro-credit's impact on
estimation techniques are used to illustrate this point.  poverty and vulnerability can be strengthened  if credit is
Zaman discusses several ways by which membership in  provided jointly with other financial (savings and
micro-credit programs reduces vulnerability - by  insurance) and nonfinancial (legal education, food relief)
smoothing consumption, building assets, providing  interventions.
emergency assistance during natural disasters, and
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This paper  explores  the relationship  between  micro-credit  and  the reduction  of poverty  and
vulnerability  by focussing  on BRAC,  one of the largest  micro-credit  providers  in Bangladesh.
The main  argument  in this paper  is that micro-credit  contributes  to mitigating  a number  of factors
that contribute  to vulnerability,  whereas  the impact  on income-poverty  is a function  of borrowing
beyond  a certain  loan  threshold  and to a certain  extent contingent  on how  poor  the household  is to
start with. This argument  is illustrated  by complementing  the existing  literature  with some
empirical  analysis  of household  survey  data collected  in Bangladesh  in 1995.
Consumption  data from 1072  households  is used to show  that the largest  effect  on poverty  arises
when a moderate-poor  BRAC  loanee  borrows  more  than 10000  taka ($200)  in cumulative  loans.
A number  of pathways  by which  micro-credit  can reduce  vulnerability,  namely  by strengthening
crisis-coping  mechanisms  (the 1998  flood in Bangladesh  is used  as a case study),  building  assets
and 'empowering'  women  are  discussed.  Data from 1568  women  are used  to construct  sixteen
'female empowerment'  indicators  and the empirical  analysis  that follows  suggests  that micro-
credit has the greatest  effect  on female  control  over assets and also on her knowledge  of social
issues  controlling  for a host of other  characteristics.
1.0 Introduction
The existing  evidence  on the impact  of micro-credit  on poverty  in Bangladesh  is not clear-cut.
There is work  that suggests  that access  to credit has the potential  to significantly  reduce  poverty
(Khandker 1998);  on the other  hand  there is also research  which argues  that micro-credit  has
minimal impact  on poverty  reduction  (Morduch  1998).
The evidence  on reducing  vulnerability  is somewhat  clearer.  The  provision  of micro-credit  has
been  found to strengthen  crisis-coping  mechanisms,  diversify  income-earning  sources,  build
assets and improve  the status  of women  (Hashemi  et al 1996,  Montgomery  et al 1996,  Morduch
1998,  Husain  et al 1998).
This paper  explores  the relationship  between  micro-credit  and the reduction  of poverty  and
vulnerability  by focussing  on BRAC,  one of the largest  micro-credit  providers  in Bangladesh.
The main argument  in this paper  is that micro-credit  contributes  to mitigating  a number  of factors
that contribute  to vulnerability  whereas  the impact  on income-poverty  is a function  of borrowing
beyond  a certain  loan  threshold  and to a certain  extent contingent  on how poor  the household  is to
start  with. This argument  is illustrated  by complementing  the existing  literature  with some
empirical  analysis  of household  survey  data collected  in one region  of Bangladesh  in 1995.  The
paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2.0. provides  a detailed  literature  review  concentrating  on
the issues  that will be explored  in the subsequent  sections.  Section  3.0. moves  onto an analysis  of
the poverty-impact  of BRAC's  micro-credit  program  in one region  of Bangladesh.  Section  4.0.-6.0. assesses micro-credit's role in reducing vulnerability by strengthening crisis-coping
mechanisms, building assets and 'empowering'  women. Section 7.0. concludes by summarizing
the main findings and drawing a few policy implications.
2.0. Micro-credit, poverty and vulnerability in Bangladesh: what does the literature say?
The evidence on the impact of micro-credit can be assessed from two inter-related angles. Firstly
who does credit reach and secondly how does it affect the welfare of different groups of
individuals and households? This section will briefly look at 'targeting issues' before moving
onto the evidence on household welfare; the focus will be on BRAC households (see appendix I
for a detailed description of the organization) although the evidence from other micro-credit
programs will also be discussed in passing.
BRAC's official 'targeting' criteria are households who have less than 0.5 acres (50 decimals) of
land and whose main occupation is manual labour. In practice, the land criterion is the one that is
more closely adhered to in the field. Several studies show that between 15-30% of BRAC
members are from 'non-target' households measured in terms of land (Mustafa et al 1996,
Montgomery et al 1996, Zaman 1998, Khandker 1998)2.  However these households are typically
marginal farmers and can be considered part of the 'vulnerable non-poor' group, prone to
transient bouts of poverty (Zaman 1998). On the other hand there is also evidence that there are a
large proportion of extremely-poor households in BRAC groups (Khandker 1998, Husain 1998,
Zaman 1998). For instance in Khandker's sample 65% of BRAC households had no agricultural
land compared to 55% for Grameen members and 58% for a comparable Government-run micro-
credit program. Moreover non-land indicators of extreme poverty (number of income earners,
illiteracy, female headedness, disabled household head) also point to the fact that BRAC targets a
significant number of extremely poor households (Halder and Husain 1999).
Not only do the poorest join BRAC's credit program, but their borrowing pattern is similar to
better-off members of their group (Zaman 1998, Halder and Husain 1999). In other words the
presence of wealthier households does not appear to affect the credit supply to poor households;
however there is evidence to suggest that poorer households use a larger share of their loans for
consumption purposes compared to better-off households (Halder and Husain op.cit). Having
noted that the poorest join BRAC's credit program and that they also actively borrow after they
join,  it has to be mentioned that there is evidence which suggests that households who join micro-
credit programs a few years after the village group has been established tend to be less poor
2 It is interesting to compare this figure with Copestake's (1992) evaluation of India's Integrated Rural Development
Project (IRDP) where the proportion of non poor households ranged upto 36%.
2compared to the members who join at the start of the program. This is reflected in the landholding
figures in table 2.0. for BRAC members and a similar pattern has been observed for Grameen
Bank members (Matin 1998). This feature of better-off households  joining over time has also
been noted as a general rule of thumb in many targeted anti-poverty programs worldwide (Lipton
1996).
The poverty-reduction impact of micro-credit in Bangladesh remains controversial. Data
collected by the World Bank in 1992 have been used to show widely varying results depending
on the methodology chosen to assess impact. Khandker (1998) estimates that for every 100  taka
lent to a woman, household consumption increases by 18 taka; interestingly the figure is II taka
if the same amount was lent to a man. Moderate poverty falls by around 15% and ultra-poverty by
25% for households who have been BRAC members for upto three years controlling for other
factors according to the author. Interestingly, this rate of poverty reduction appears to decline
with increasing membership length. For instance, for households who have been members for
more than five years the absolute rate of reduction was 9% for moderate poverty and 18% for
ultra-poverty suggesting that the rate of poverty reduction per year was considerably lower than
for households who had been members for upto three years. Moreover, given the fact that the
'less than three years' category has a lower average cumulative loan 'size (3348 taka) compared to
the 'five years-plus' category (6567 taka), Khandker's results also suggest that the poverty
reduction impact of credit declines with cumulative loan size for BRAC. Khandker's results are
more intuitive in the case of the two other micro-credit programs in his study, Grameen and
BRDB 3, where the rate of reduction in the incidence of poverty increases with cumulative loan
size.
Morduch (1998) points out a problem with this analysis. He notes that the assumption of perfect
targeting which underlies Khandker's selectivity correction is flawed given the fact that in the
data set 30% of households were above the eligibility threshold. Using an alternative approach to
correct for selectivity, Morduch finds no evidence of increases in consumption (and therefore
reduction in poverty) using the same data. However, he does find that micro-credit contributes to
reducing household vulnerability, since consumption variability is 47% lower for eligible 4
Grameen households. 54% lower for eligible BRAC households and 51% lower for eligible
BRDB households compared to a control group. 5 This consumption smoothing is driven by
income smoothing as evidenced by the significantly lower labour supply variability experienced
3 BRDB stands for the Bangladesh Rural Development Board
4Morduch  only includes households who fulfill the targeting criteria of the three organizations and labels them
'eligible households'by micro-credit members compared to the control group 5. The importance  of this result cannot be
over-emphasized given the fact that seasonal deficits play a key palt in the poverty process in
Bangladesh (Rahman 1995). Essentially Morduch's results indicate that program participants do
not benefit in terms of greater consumption levels, but they participate because they benefit from
risk reduction.
There is other work in Bangladesh supporting the hypothesis that micro-credit impact is more
significant for vulnerability than for income-poverty. Montgomery et al (1996) use retrospective
questioning to calculate changes in household income 'since the last loan' for a sample of ninety
six BRAC borrowers. They find that improvements in household income are greater for third time
borrowers compared to first time borrowers but these gains are small (6% for third time
borrowers and 1% for first time borrowers). However, the growth in 'productive enterprise'
assets, show a 95% growth for third time borrowers during the course of the last loan period and
24% for first time borrowers. Whilst these results are intriguing the limited sample size makes
robust comparisons difficult and hence the conclusions need to be interpreted with considerable
caution. Mustafa et al (1995) compare households who joined four years prior to their 1993
survey with households who joined one year before the survey. The 'older' members are found to
have  'average gross household asset values which are 112% higher' (pp. 32) and 'average weekly
household expenditure which was 26% greater than the 'newer' members ' (pp. 32). Evidence on
the beneficial impact of micro-credit on vulnerability can also be found in case study material.
Khan et al (1998) track thirty five BRAC borrowers over a period of two years with repeated
interviews. The pattern that emerges is that of households using credit for multiple purposes,
smoothing consumption as well as investing in existing or new enterprises.
There appears to be a growing consensus that moderate-poor micro-credit borrowers benefit more
than extremely poor borrowers in terms of a reduction in income (consumption) poverty. The
basic premise is that the poorest have a number of constraints (fewer income sources, worse
health and education etc) which prevent them from investing the loan in a high-return activity.
This could be due to the higher risk associated with a high-return activity or because of a long
gestation period for the returns to accrue (Wood and Sharif 1997). This is borne out by detailed
case-study evidence (Farashuddin et al 1998) and by comparing participants of credit programs
5 These  results  are  statistically  significant  at the 95% level.
6 Morduch's  estimates  of labour  supply  variability  is 39-46%  lower  for micro-credit  members  compared  to a control
group.
7 The authors  estimate  that around  67% of the loan is used for investment  purposes,  another  12%  to repay
existing  loans,  7% for  household  consumption  and the remainder  used for other  activities.
4who cater to different socio-economic  groups (Montgomery et al  1996). The empirical analysis
in this paper will attempt to shed some more light on this issue.
The pathways by which micro-credit reduces vulnerability, that have been discussed here, relate
to income and consumption smoothing and asset building. However, the impact of credit on
female empowerment, or a reduction in 'female vulnerability' has also received considerable
attention.
Female empowerment in Bangladesh can be viewed against the backdrop of 'patriarchy', defined
by Cain et al (1979) as a 'set of social relations with a material base that enables men to
dominate women' and hence can be thought of in terms of an improvement in intra-household
gender relations (Naved 1994,  Kabeer 1995, Hashemi et al 1996). Moreover given the institution
of 'purdah' (loosely translated as 'veil'),  a pervasive social construct which restricts the female
sphere within a typical Bangladeshi household, 'female empowerment' can also be viewed in
terms of a woman's interactions outside the homestead and the acquisition of skills, knowledge
and confidence that such interactions can bring (Amin et al op.cit., White 1992,  Mahmud 1994).
The impact of credit on female empowerment (reduction in vulnerability) is controversial in the
literature. One camp believes that credit programs positively contributes to female empowerment
and a variety of empirical results are used to argue this case. A second, more skeptical, viewpoint
believes that credit programs do little to alter gender relations in favour of females but in fact may
contribute to reinforcing existing gender imbalances.
Given the wide range of possible indicators of empowerment it is useful to start by reviewing the
criteria that other researchers have used and their broad findings. Amin et al's (1994) work in
thirty six villages in Bangladesh showed that membership in BRAC positively affected a
woman's  decision making role, her control over resources and mobility but less so on their
attitudes regarding marriage and education of their daughters. The authors also note that their
respondents felt that membership in credit programs is important from the standpoint of reducing
their chances of desertion by their husbands. It is the fact that women are viewed as the source of
an important resource that appears to underly these improvements in their status. This is
8 Montgomery  et al compare  the performance  of BRAC  borrowers  with  the borrowers  from  a Government-
run micro-credit  scheme,  the Thana  Resource  Development  and Employment  Programme  (TRDEP).
TRDEP's  borrowers'  initial  endowment  conditions  is shown  to be higher  than  BRAC's  (average  pre-
loan landholding  is 46 and 30 decimals  for TRDEP  and BRAC  members  respectively  and  the
percentage  of income  derived  from  daily labour  is 5%  and 32%  respectively)  whilst  the credit-
delivery  mechanism  and average  loan size  are broadly  speaking  very  similar.  The  typical  TRDEP
borrower's  increase  in assets  and income  during  the course  of the most recent  loan  is higher  than
BRAC's giving  rise  to the author's  contention  that better-off  borrowers  benefit  more  than  poorer
borrowers.
5reinforced by Naved (1994)9  who finds that the women credit-program participants in her sample
felt their status had improved within the household due to the fact that they were seen as income
earners for the family through their access to credit. The women conceptualized this improvement
in status by stating that they were more active participants in household decision making and had
more control over household income, particularly the portion which was derived from their own
earning. The women in this article also discussed the benefits of participating in a group in terms
of addressing social problems as a joint unit citing a number of incidents where group pressure
helped resolve family disputes.
Another seminal article supporting the 'favourable view' on credit and empowerment is that by
Hashemi et al (1996). The authors develop an 'empowerment index' based on eight
empowerment indicators namely mobility, economic security, ability to make small purchases,
ability to make larger purchases, involvement in major decisions, participation in public protests
and political campaigning, relative freedom from family domination and political and legal
awareness. Their analysis establishes that a woman contributing to her household's income is a
significant contributing factor towards her empowerment, a claim also made by White (1992)
based on her fieldwork in rural Bangladesh. However Hashemi et al (op.cit) also show that the
,....probability of empowerment is eight to twelve  times as highfor  a woman who is contributing
to  family  support or involved in a credit program (and not contributing) (pp. 645 parenthesis in
original text). In other words the authors argue that credit programs can empower women
independently of whether they contribute to family income or not, having controlled for other
factors.
The focus of those skeptical about the empowering effect of micro-credit has been on the issue of
women's  control over loans. Goetz et al (1996) used a sample of 253 female borrowers covering
four rural credit providers in Bangladesh and classified the extent of control by the loanee into
five categories: full, significant, partial, very limited and no involvement. Their qualitative
investigation of loan histories led the authors to conclude that 'About 63% of the cases  fall  into
the three categories of  partial, very limited or no control indicating a  fairly significant  pattern of
loss of direct control over credit' (pp. 49). The authors disaggregated their data in terms of loan
activity and concluded that investing in traditional women's work increased their chances of being
able to control the loan. Moreover the paper suggests that an inverse relationship between loan
amount and control exists as well as diminishing control beyond a threshold level of membership
9  Naved  (1994)  uses  Participatory  Rural  Appraisal  (PRA)  techniques  to identify  the effect  of participation  in
Save  The Children's  savings  and credit  program  in Manikanj.
6a,ge.  This is explained by the gendered divisions of cash control within the household; women
may be permitted to handle small amounts but men take control beyond a certain amount.
However the article is flawed in several respects. For a start the interpretation that 63% of women
having 'partial, very limited or no control' whilst factually true is also misleading in the sense
that one could sum up the figures and also conclude that 61.3% of the women have 'full,
significant or partial' control over their loans and therefore a fair degree of control over their
credit. Moreover, the disaggregation of the sample into extremely small sample sizeg' makes
comparisons of loan control across the four organizations studied unreliable. Furthermore, in the
case of BRAC, the authors suggested complementing credit with social development inputs given
the fact that only 28% of the cases fell in the 'full'  or 'significant'  loan control categories.
However, BRAC's social development inputs are more extensive than Grameen Bank's and yet
the female loan control figures in their paper are higher for the more minimalist Grameen
program, which contradicts the authors' hypothesis. Whilst the paper recognizes that the low
BRAC figure could be a consequence of the organization's focus on promoting non traditional
enterprises for women, it fails to mention that for many such new activities BRAC takes
responsibility for much of the decision making regarding the enterprise accounting for the
borrower's  lower 'loan control' scores1 1. Montgomery et al (1996) also have reservations about
the 'empowering effect' of BRAC's approach to micro-credit. Their argument is based largely on
secondary sources and a small field survey of sixty seven BRAC borrowers again focusing on the
issue of control over loans. Whilst the authors admit that their sample is small, they on balance
support Goetz et al's (op.cit) and Whites' (1991) view that micro-credit reinforces existing gender
'  For instance  the total  sample  size  for one  organization  is thirty  nine  women  out of which  percentage
figures  were derived  for the five  categories  of control.
1 Activities  can be non  traditional  in the sense  that  they could  be new to rural  women  or new in  general in
rural Bangladesh.  BRAC  provides  loans  to both  types of activities  as mentioned  by Goetz  et al (op.cit)  but
provides  a comprehensive  'support  structure'  mainly  for the latter  type as part of its 'integrated  credit'
programs  e.g. sericulture  and  social  forestry.  For instance  in the sericulture  sector  BRAC  supplies  the eggs
to the silkworm  rearer,  plants  the mulbery  trees,  trains the entrepreneur  in silk  rearing,  arranges  for
extension  services  by a BRAC  rearing  specialist,  purchases  the cocoons  from  the rearer  from  her
homestead  and supplies  these  to a BRAC  silk reeling  centre.  As such the woman  loses  'control'  over  her
loan in that  she does not  make  decisions  regarding  input  supply  or marketing  but she is not losing  this  to
another  member  of the household  but  to the organization.  Moreover  this  'loss' is likely  to be temporary  in
that BRAC  intends  to withdraw  its support  mechanism  over  time  once  these  currently  'non  traditional'
activities  become  more  commonplace  in  rural society  and complementary  services  are made  available  by
either  the private  sector  or the Government  in  terms of factor  and output  markets  as well  as extension
services.  However  for  activities  common  in rural  areas  but non traditional  for women  BRAC  does  not have
this type of support  yet e.g. rural  restaurants  and grocery  shop loans  as these  activities  are part  of BRAC's
'minimalist  credit' intervention.  It is assumed  that given  the nature  of these  activities  both  sexes  within  the
household  will pool  their labour  to manage  the activity;  it is common  to see  the female  supplying  the food
to the rural restaurants  and  an adult  male,  commonly  her husband,  serving  the customers.
7patterns and inequalities by promoting traditional income generation activities, which they
believe do little to alter the social status quo.
In view of the fact that the decision-making over the actual loan is likely to be shared by the
borrower, her family members and BRAC depending on the end-use of the loan, it can be argued
that it is more appropriate to focus on changes in the overall status of a woman derived from the
fact that she is the source of an important household resource (Sen 1990). Hashemi et al (op.cit)
pick up on this point and using ethnographic data from sixty credit program participants they
conclude that whilst women who control their loans have the most chance of being empowered,
even women who surrender  all of their loans to their husbands are likely to be more empowered
than non-members.
On the whole, the evidence presented by those who argue that micro-credit improves female
status within the household appears more convincing that that argued by the 'skeptics' camp.
There are two main reasons for this contention. First the underlying thread of the 'positive'
argument, that access to an important household resource (credit) enhances a female's status
within the household is both intuitively appealing and resonates with the theoretical literature on
bargaining models of the household (Lundberg and Pollack 1993), Secondly, the focus on female
control over loans as a key component of the 'skeptics'  argument fails to recognize that credit
enters the overall household income pool and that household members jointly participate in the
loan investment. One of the empirical sections in this paper aims to build on the literature by
estimating the impact of BRAC's credit program on a range of variables that attempt to measure
female empowerment.
We now move onto the next part of this paper which will use recent data to assess the poverty-
impact issue in greater depth.
3.0. BRAC's impact on poverty: an empirical analysis
A household questionnaire was administered to 547 BRAC members and a control group of 525
eligible non-members in ten villages where BRAC operates in Matlab district, Bangladesh. This
data was collected by the BRAC-ICDDR,B Joint Research Project in Matlab district, Bangladesh
between April and August 1995.  Details of the research project, the survey and the variables that
were collected can be found in Zaman (1998). The survey contained a detailed consumption
expenditure section from which the poverty measure for this analysis, total consumption per adult
equivalent, was constructed.
As with any program evaluation, issues of selectivity bias and the counterfactual need to be
addressed. In the case of micro-credit the additional issue of the fungibility of money also needs
8to be taken into account. Appendix 2 discusses these issues and the way this paper approaches
these concerns.
In view of the need to estimate the selection process into BRAC's program we start by defining a
reduced form BRAC participation equation:
Yi  =-  + aXi  + Ui  (equation 1.0)
Y'  is a latent (unobserved) continuous variable representing the propensity of a household to
join BRAC
Xi  is the vector of individual, household and village characteristics that affect the probability
of participation in BRAC
The problem is that there may be a systematic, unobserved process that governs both the
'participation'  equation and the 'consumption equation'. This would lead to the error terms in the
two equations being correlated and conventional estimation methods such as OLS would produce
biased and inconsistent results (Reilly 1990).
Hence the potential endogeneity of the 'BRAC variable' needs to be tested and controlled for. We
use the Heckman two-step technique which first estimates equation 1.0.  and derives maximum
likelihood estimates from the coefficients of the 'participation equation'. Using these estimates a
variable known as the Mills ratio is constructed as follows:
Ai =  p +8  Xi) - (p +c  Xi)
Where  0  is the density function of a standard normal variable and
vp  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution
A,  is the Mills ratio term
The second stage involves adding the Mills ratio to the consumption equation and estimating the
equation using OLS, as follows:
C 2 i=+6Wi+f,6 2yi +AAi  +
where  E(~)  = 0
C, is the log of total consumption per adult equivalent
Wj  is a vector of individual, household and village characteristics
9A crucial problem in empirical work is finding an appropriate identification variable for this two
step procedure. This variable needs to influence participation but not poverty. Moreover, even if
an appropriate identification  variable is found, the results from the procedure can be sensitive to
the choice of this variable. Due to this limitation the results obtained from this procedure need to
be checked for  robustness'.
In the following empirical estimation the 'number of eligible households in each village in 1992'
will be used as the 'identification' variable. 12 The rationale behind this is that while a larger
number of potential members in a village will reduce the chance of any one eligible household
from participating in a BRAC Village Organization 13 it is difficult to see why this variable should
affect an individual household's poverty status. However, this variable will have to be tested
using the data to see whether it is a significant determinant of the 'participation model' and not
significant in the ;consumption  equation'.
Detailed definitions of the variables used in the empirical estimation are given in table 3.0.
The variables used in the 'poverty model' are those that can be theoretically justified using the
basic agricultural household model and also those that one can argue are exogenous when
modelling poverty. Membership in other NGO's is included to capture the effect of alternatives to
BRAC credit. The amount borrowed from BRAC is interacted with landholding size in order to
assess whether the effect of credit is any different for households who are ultra-poor (proxied as
those with less than ten decimals of land) compared with moderate-poor households (proxied as
BRAC members with greater than ten decimals of land). Partitioning the poor in this way is
justified by the differences in poverty across these landholding groups (BBS 1995).
3.1  Results from the multivariate analysis
When equation 1.0. is estimated we find that the TGHH92 (number of TG households in the
village in 1992) variable is a significant determinant of participation in BRAC (at the 1%  level).
When the same independent variables are used to model consumption per adult equivalent one
12 1 am grateful to Professor Mark Pitt of Brown University for making this suggestion
13 A BRAC VO's size ranges from 25-40  members. Whilst larger villages have more than one VO there is still a large
portion of eligible households who do not join or are not selected. The percentage of TG households covered in
the Matiab villages where RDP is present is 51%
10finds that TGHH92 variable is not significant, at the 10% levell  4. As a result, this variable can be
used as an identification variable in the Heckman procedure.
The first equation that is estimated is the Heckman two-step equation with the TGHH92  variable
as the identifying variable. In order to test for selectivity we use a basic specification for the
second stage consumption equation using only the BRAC membership dummy as the 'BRAC
variable':
Equation 3. 1.(using TGHH92 as the identification variable)
BRVO = f(AGI560M, AGI56OF, ADEQPR, AGHHH, AGHSQ, EARNER, IEMBNK,
HHHLBR, LGLAND, MARKET, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH,  TGHH92)
LGCOAD = f(AG1560M, AG156OF,  ADEQPR, AGHHH, AGHSQ, EARNER, IEMBNK,
HHHLBR, LGLAND, MARKET, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH, BRVO.
LAMBDA)
The coefficients and significance levels of the BRVO and LAMBDA terms are reported in table .
The result suggests that there is no selectivity bias. However in order to test for the robustness of
this result the 'identification on functional form' method is used in equation 3.2. This means that
TGHH92 is included in both equations along with the other common independent  variables.
Identification is achieved by exploiting the fact that the Mills ratio term (lambda) is a non-linear
combination of the independent  variables in the 'participation equation'.
Equation 3.2. (identifying on functional form)
BRVO = f(AG1560M, AG1560F, ADEQPR, AGEHHH, AGSQ, EARNER, IEMBAN,
HHHLBR, LGLAND, MARKET, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH, TGHH92)
LGCOAD = f(AG1560M, AG1560F, ADEQPR, AGEHHH, AGSQ, EARNER, IEMBAN,
HHHLBR, LGLAND, MARKET, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH, TGHH92,
BRVO, LAMBDA)
14 The coefficient  for the  TGHH92  in the participation  equation  is -0.001 (significant  at the 1%  level)  and for
consumption  it is -0.0004  (not  significant  at the 10%  level).
1.1The coefficient and significance levels of the BRVO and LAMBDA terms are reported in table
4.0. Now the coefficient on the LAMBDA term suggests that there is selectivity bias (significant
at the 10% level).
The significance of the lambda coefficient and the sign of the 'BRAC' term are strikingly
different in the two models which raises doubts as to the robustness of TGHH92 as an
identification variable. Hence, it is difficult to make a conclusive comment on whether there is
selectivity bias or not.
However even though 'identifying on functional form' is not an ideal way of correcting for
selectivity bias it does have its merits. For a start the finding that the problem of selectivity bias
exists in this model is intuitively appealing. The positive coefficient on the lambda term suggests
that the unobservable factors which influence participation in BRAC are positively correlated
with the unobservable factors which influence household consumption. For instance more
confident, enterprising women are more likely to join BRAC and are also more likely to
positively affect household welfare.
Secondly, identifying on functional form as opposed to using the TGHH92 variable allows us to
incorporate village-level effects by including a dummy variable for each village. Equation 3.1.
cannot accommodate village dummies as the TGHH92 variable is itself a village-level variable. It
can only include other similar village variables (IEMBNK, MRKTIM) which partially control for
village effects.
The question also arises as to whether one should simply use OLS in view of the lack of an
'ideal'  way of correcting for selectivity. As such two further regressions will be estimated; one
which identifies on functional form but with village dummies and another simple OLS model
with village dummies. In both these two specifications the other BRAC variables such as loan
size will be included.
Equation 3.3 (identifying on functional form with village dummies)
BRVO = f(AG1560M. AG1560F, ADEQPR, AGEHHH, AGSQ, EARNER, HHHLBR,
LGLAND, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH, VIL2, VIL3, VIL4, VIL5, VIL6,
VIL7, VIL8, VIL9, VILIO)
LNCOAD = f(AG1560M, AG1560F, ADEQPR, AGEHHH, AGSQ, EARNER, HHHLBR,
LGLAND, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH, SECHHH, SXHHH, VIL2, VIL3, VIL4, VIL5, VIL6,
12VIL7, VIL8, VIL9, VILI0, BRVO, MLOADUM1, MLOADUM2, MLOADUM3,  ULOADUMI,
ULOADUM2, ULOADUM3,  MEMLENI, MEMLEN2, MEMLEN3, MEMLEN4,  LAMBDA
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Equation 3.4. (OLS with village dummies)
LNCOAD = f(AGI 560M, AG1560F, ADEQPR, AGEHHH, AGSQ, EARNER, HHHLBR,
LGLAND, OTHNGO, PRIMHHH,  SECHHH, SXHHH, VIL2, VIL3, VIL4, VIL5,  VIL6,
VIL7, VIL8, VIL9, VIL10, BRVO, MLOADUM1, MLOADUM2, MLOADUM3, ULOADUMI,
ULOADUM2, ULOADUM3  , MEMLENI, MEMLEN2, MEMLEN3, MEMLEN4)
The results for the BRAC variables and the lambda term can be found in table 4.0. All the results
in table 4.0 are heteroscedasticity-corrected (Whites correction) estimates 1 6*
Table 4.0. shows that in both equations 3.3. and 3.4. the coefficient for the BRAC members who
have more than ten decimals of land and have borrowed more than 10000  taka is positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the interpretation of this coefficient is not
unambiguous.
Borrowing more than 10,000 taka (the mean loan size for the '10,000 plus' category is 13090
taka) raises a moderate-poor households' consumption per adult equivalent by 18.8% relative to
an identical non-borrowing BRAC member in equation 3.3. Equation 3.4. suggests that borrowing
more than 10,000 taka raises a households' consumption per adult equivalent by 19.3% relative to
an identical non-borrowing BRAC member. However, if the 'base category' is changed from
'non-borrowing member' to 'eligible non member' then the effect of borrowing more than 10000
taka varies significantly according to the specification used. For instance in equation 3.3. the
BRVO coefficient is significantly negative and a household borrowing more than 10000  taka is
48% worse off compared to an eligible non-member. On the other hand according to the OLS
equation 3.4. a household with more than 10000 taka in loans is 13.8% better off than an eligible
non-member.
Hence the conclusions on RDP's  impact on its members' welfare depend on which econometric
specification one considers to be more valid and which control group (non borrowing member or
eligible non member) is considered more appropriate. In view of the fact that cumulative
borrowing is largely a function of membership length (Mustafa et al 1995, Montgomery et al
15 The BRAC  loan  and membership  duration  dummies  could  not be included  in the first stage  equation  due  to
endogeneity.
16  The econometric  package  LIMDEP  was  used for  the empirical  work  in this chapter.
131996) and socio-economic differences between borrowers and non-borrowing  members are
minimal (Zaman 1998)  it can be argued that the non-borrowing member control group is a better
comparison group.
It would be tempting to conclude unequivocally that the ultra-poor benefit less than the moderate
poor. However, given that the coefficients for the loan sizes which are smaller than 10000 taka
are not significant at the 10% level for both households with more than ten decimals of land and
those with less than ten decimals compared to non-borrowers it is difficult to be so sure. One can
only point to the MLOADUM3 result and conclude that whilst there is some evidence that credit
has the potential to benefit the moderate poor, the Matlab data cannot argue the same for the
ultra-poor. However, the coefficient on ULOADUM3 is only marginally not significant (p
0.12) which could suggest that the ultra-poor may benefit significantly at a higher loan threshold.
The fact that the coefficient on the 'ten thousand' taka category is markedly different compared to
the other loan categories may seem puzzling. However, households who had borrowed more than
ten thousand taka had spent significantly more (at the 5% level) in terms of non-land productive
assets'  (poultry, livestock in particular) during the one year prior to the survey compared to
members who had borrowed less than ten thousand taka17. Montgomery et al's (1996) results on
the sharp growth in productive assets for third time borrowers, compared to first time borrowers,
is closely related to the evidence presented here.
The intuition behind significant improvements in welfare taking place once a household has
crossed a certain loan threshold can also be possibly interpreted as a switch from traditional, low-
return on-farm activities to higher-return off-farm activities over time (Ravallion and Wodon
1996). As households become more accustomed to borrowing from BRAC they are likely to be
more willing to take such risks. Table 2.0. appears to show that an occupational shift takes place
as membership length (which is highly associated with cumulative loans) increases. This loan
threshold effect could also be due to the fact that initial loans are often used for consumption
purposes, repaying debts and repairing homesteads while subsequent ones are used for investment
purposes.
Whilst most observable 'initial endowment' conditions have been controlled for in the regression,
the selectivity correction in the analysis does not cater for the fact that there may be certain
unobservable characteristics  that influence a certain household's decision to borrow more than
10000 taka which also positively affect household welfare. However, given that the loan size is a
17The  expenditure per head during the year prior to the survey on 'productive assets' was taka 368, 542. 438, 768 for
the 'no loan', 'less than 5000 taka',  '5000-10000 taka' and 'greater than 10000 taka' categories.
14cumulative total (i.e. not an average) of 10000 taka, which is largely a function of membership
length, this problem is unlikely to seriously affect the results.
One result which does appear 'initial endowment induced' is the significantly positive coefficient
on the MEMLENI variable. Common sense and empirical evidence (Mustafa et al 1996)  suggests
that the duration of membership is more likely to positively influence welfare levels after a few
years have elapsed for the reasons discussed earlier. As such the relatively more significant
impact of the 1-10 month membership length variable, relative to the other membership length
categories, points to the fact that this group of borrowers started 'better-off'  than 'older' members
as suggested in section 2.0.
In order to assess the other non-BRAC determinants of poverty the full regression results for
equation 3.3 are included in table 5.0. Aside from the 'BRAC variables', poverty is significantly
determined by the age, education and occupation of the household head, the dependency  ratio, the
wealth endowment of the household (as proxied by land value) and village conditions.
The next three sections of this paper address different aspects of household and individual
vulnerability. One of the key sources of vulnerability in Bangladesh is natural disasters and the
next section examines the response  of, and recourse to, BRAC during Bangladesh's recent floods.
4.0. Reducing vulnerability during a crisis: micro-credit's role in the 1998 Bangladesh
floods
Whilst under certain restrictive conditions the poor may not necessarily also be vulnerable to
fluctuations in their income (Glewwe and Hall 1998)8 it can be plausibly argued that almost all
poor households in Bangladesh are vulnerable due to the extent and frequency of natural disasters
in the country.
The June-October 1998 floods in Bangladesh have been described as the 'worst in living
memory' (World Bank 1998). Whilst the country is accustomed to yearly periods of moderate
flooding the recent floods inundated two thirds of the country' 9 and severely disrupted the daily
lives of the majority of the population. Over 1100 people died, close to half a million homes were
damaged and two of the rice crops (aus and aman) were significantly affected.
The joint response of the Government,  NGO's and the intemational donor community was crucial
in limiting the damage caused by the floods. The immediate relief effort to prevent starvation and
disease was swift and by all accounts effective. The Government focussed its relief efforts in
s Glewwe and Hall (1998) argue that poor, subsistence farmers in remote areas are not necessarily vulnerable (in terms
of experiencing sharp fluctuations in income) as they could be insulated from domestic and international  shocks.
19  Prior to the 1998 flood the worst recorded flood covered 52% of the country
15providing food rations 20 and organizing shelters for the homeless. Grants and loans for
agricultural rehabilitation were also provided.
The NGO sector also produced a coordinated relief and rehabilitation effort" 1 BRAC's
immediate response was to provide food and safe water through-out the country 22. BRAC also
focussed on post-flood disease control needs; it distributed nearly a million packets of oral
rehydration saline (ORS) to prevent diarrhoea and its health staff worked with govemment health
workers in their disease prevention activities. BRAC operated a multi-pronged rehabilitation
program following the relief effort. A key part of it was to supply seeds to farmers as seed storage
facilities had been badly damaged during the floods. BRAC's 'integrated program' (see appendix
I) clients were given appropriate inputs in kind to assist them in continuing their activitie;3.
BRAC schools 24 were repaired, new sanitary latrines were provided to affected member
households and an infrastructure repair public works program was initiated to create employment.
BRAC's micro-credit program also responded to the floods in the following ways:
*  In line with the other major micro-credit programs in the country, it did not declare a country-
wide repayment suspension but it did instruct its branch managers to apply their judgement
and discretion with borrowers who could not repay. Branch managers decided to suspend
payments in many areas where severe flooding had occurred. Table 6.0. shows the effects of
the floods on BRAC's recovery rates.
- BRAC clients could borrow 50% of their current loan amount as a new loan and the
repayment schedule was extended by six months. The idea of issuing 50% of current loans as
fresh loans was based on the assumption that whatever cash in hand households  had at the
time of the floods was used up for immediate consumption needs. The extra liquiditv was
intended for daily expenses during the crisis, as well as for productive investment.
20  In September 1998 during the peak of the floods the government distributed Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) cards
which ensured eight kilograms of foodgrain to four million poor households 20 for four months. The government
also initiated new public works programs ('Test Relief Program) and extended existing ones (Food-for-Work
program).
21  A key part of the coordinating effort was done by the 'Citizen's  Initiative for Confronting the Disaster' which was
composed of senior civil society representatives including the heads of Grameen, BRAC and Proshika.
22  Makeshift kitchens were opened in BRAC's field offices and bread, molasses and safe drinking water were
distributed to around half a million households.
23 For instance to address the damage to trees, BRAC supplied a variety of saplings to its member's involved in
forestry and sericulture activities. BRAC also assisted villagers who borrowed for poultry-rearing  purposes and
those that had taken fisheries loans. This was done by repairing poultry shelters and ponds as well as procuring
new birds and fish fingerlings.
24 BRAC operates around 34000 Non Formal Primary Education schools
16*  BRAC allowed members who have a good repayment record to pay off the balance of their
outstanding loan in advance so that they could apply for a new loan.
*  BRAC allowed members to withdraw upto 50%  of their savings
Field interviews with twenty BRAC borrowers in two regions, Matlab and Manikanj, were
conducted in January 1999.  The main objective was to assess the client's perception of the role
BRAC's credit program played in mitigating the effects of the crisis as well as to take stock of
other crisis-coping mechanisms. Participants were also asked to describe their loan history and
comment on their general impressions about the impact of BRAC's credit program on their
household welfare over the years. Table 7.0. provides details of the borrowing patterns of the
individuals surveyed.
There are three main messages related to credit and coping in crisis that emerge out of the
discussions with BRAC's clients, conversations with BRAC credit staff and figures obtained at
BRAC head office:
*  The majority of clients place a high priority on repaying BRAC loans, even during a crisis
period, as they see it as the only way to obtain larger loans and increase their liquidity.
During the flood period households preferred to cut back on their daily consumption or
borrow (interest-free) from relatives rather than miss installment payments. In fact the main
source of cash for loan repayments during the floods were interest-free loans from relatives
(Ahmed 1998). Repayment rates fell (see table 6.0) during the floods but recovered in the
immediate aftermath and by December 1998 recovery rates were close to pre-flood levels.
*  Having access to their savings was welcome during the crisis but recourse to it was less than
one would have expected. One of the reasons for this is that clients know that larger savings
deposits within BRAC means access to larger loans5. Hence they perceive withdrawing
money from their savings accounts as a de-facto interest-free loan as they may need to 're-
deposit' some or all of the amount they withdrew in order to be eligible for the loan size that
they require. However the main reason for the low withdrawal rate was probably the
inaccessibility of the BRAC branch during the height of the floods in many regions - many
depositors could not literally access their savings. In September 1998, during the peak of the
floods, average savings withdrawal for all BRAC branches was 61% of the July figure.
However, when the floods receded in October, average savings withdrawals more than
doubled within a month and continued rising until year-end. BRAC members were not the
17only ones who showed a greater than expected reticence to withdraw their savings during this
time of dire need. Two organizations with a significant focus on savings products, Buro
Tangail and Safe Save, also experienced the same phenomenon with savings withdrawals in
branches hard hit by the floods similar to marginally affected branches (Wright 1999).
Membership in BRAC's credit program offered only partial insurance to flood-affected
households. These households used a multitude of survival strategies from drawing down
food stocks, to using up their cash savings, borrowing from relatives and also borrowing from
money-lenders. One of the most common coping mechanisms was cutting down on food
consumption and to a certain extent switching to cheaper items, though scope for the latter
was limited for the poor.
5.0. Reducing vulnerabilitv through asset-creation
An important forrn of self-insurance  against crises is building up a household's asset base which
can reduce vulnerability through a number of channels. For a start, some assets can be readily
sold to meet immediate consumption needs. Secondly, asset-building can improve
creditworthiness, thereby improving a household's borrowing chances during a crisis. Thirdly, a
larger and more diverse asset base can reduce covariant risk.
The process by which micro-credit stimulates asset-creation, is interesting. In table 2.0. one finds
that the 'oldest'  members have on average the least land but also the highest value of non land
assets; one plausible explanation is that borrowing from BRAC led to investment in productive
capital (e.g. rickshaw, poultry, grocery shop) thereby improving their non-land asset position.
Moreover the proportion of manual labourer households is lower in the 'oldest' category
suggesting that the growth of non-land assets may have induced a shift from on-farm activities to
off-farm self employment. Longer membership in BRAC also induces a growth in savings as
shown in table 2.0, due to the requirement that members have to save at least two taka a week.
The relevance of this for the reduction in vulnerability has been discussed in the previous section
and will be probed further in the concluding section.
Table 8.0. is drawn from a large national survey of 1700 BRAC households conducted in 1996
(Husain ed. 1998) Whilst mean differences cannot be used to directly attribute causality, these
figures lend some weight to casual field observations that suggest members use their initial loans
to improve their housing condition and subsequently build up other productive assets.
25 BRAC, and most other micro-credit programs in Bangladesh require a minimum savings balance prior to disbursing
a loan. In BRAC's case it is 5% of the disbursed amount for the first loan, 10% for the second. 15% for the third
and 20% for the fourth and beyond.
18However, whilst investing in enterprises can help build assets it also has its associated risks.
Returns from the investment can be negative and clients can then face the prospect of asset-
depletion, or reduction in consumption, in order to repay loans. Table 9.0. compares the profit
rates from seven different BRAC-financed enterprises in Matlab region. The data was collected
from seventy households (ten for each enterprise) in 1994 and the enterprises were selected by
choosing the seven most common BRAC-financed investments (Zaman et al 1994).
There is a wide range of average profits amongst the various activities. Poultry, potato cultivation
and net making head the list in terms of both economic and accounting profits 26 (over 1000 taka a
month). Grocery shops are in the 'intermediate profit' category with loanees earning nearly 600
taka a month once the opportunity cost of their time has been incorporated although in terms of
pure accounting profit this activity tops the list. In our limited sample we found that paddy
cultivation and goat rearing yield profits of less than 100 taka a month while bull fattening was
found to be a loss making endeavor.
The message from this section partially reinforces the views of those who argue that providing
credit will lead to a process of asset creation and a corresponding reduction in vulnerability.
However this section also cautions against assuming that this asset-creation will automatically
reduce poverty or vulnerability as returns to these assets are shown to be highly variable.
6.0. Reducing the vulnerability of women: the role of BRAC's credit program
Section 2.0. provided an overview of the debate regarding the role of credit programs in affecting
the status of women in a patriarchal society. This section uses survey data collected from 1568
ever-married women in Matlab region, Bangladesh between April-August 1995. Sixteen
indicators of female empowerment were created ranging from knowledge and awareness of
various social issues to ownership and control of assets and mobility. The indicators are listed in
table II and the details of how they were developed are in appendix 3.
Assessing the impact of BRAC's credit program on the various dimensions of empowerment
requires another brief discussion of the 'selectivity problem'. As noted in the opening section of
this paper it may be the case that more enterprising, dynamic women join credit programs and
that they are more likely to be 'empowered' compared to a random sample of eligible women
thereby overstating the effect of BRAC. Section 3.0. discussed the Heckman procedure where a
first stage equation with a binary dependent variable (participates/does not participate) was
estimated and a continuous dependent variable (real consumption per adult equivalent) was used
in the second stage. However, in the 'empowerment'  case we have two binary variables
26 Economic profits incorporate the opportunity cost of labour
19(participation and an 'empowerment cotrelate') which makes the econometric estimation even
more complex.
Khandker (1996) claims that 'If both the treatment and the outcome are measured as binary
indicators, identification of the treatment effect is generally not possible even with the
specification of an error distribution'(pp.  233). Maddala (1983) does not entirely eliminate the
possibility of correcting for selectivity bias in this scenario but acknowledges that '....the
expressions get very messy' (pp. 282).
Given the aifficulties with correcting for selectivity in such cases this paper opts for using simple
logit regressions to estimate the factors underlying the various empowerment correlates.
However, the possibility of 'selectivity bias'  influencing the 'BRAC effect' will be taken into
account in the discussion.
The reduced form equations will be estimated as logit regressions separately for the sixteen
empowerment correlates. The basic 'empowerment correlates' model is described below in
equation 6.0 with variable definitions in table 10.0.
EQUATION 6.0
yi  Ao7  6lhj;+5 E  ,kWik  6,  vi +j8lm  bim A1p  lip
where
y,  is one of the 'empowerment correlates'
h  is a vector of household level variables
wik  is a vector of female specific variables
Vi 1 is a vector of thirteen village dummies
bim  is a dummy variable for BRAC membership
lip  is a vector of dummy variables based on BRAC loan size
Land per adult equivalent 27 and occupation of the household head are included in the
empowerment equation as a proxy for the households socio-economic status. The number of
years of female education and the household's average years of education are included as they are
assumed to be positively associated with female empowerment particularly for the knowledge
based variables. The literature also points to a woman's marital status, her age and whether she
27 The equivalence scales used are constructed as follows: adult male (1), adult female (0.83), 10-14  year olds (0.83). 5-
9 year olds (0.7), 1-4 years (0.5), babies (0.2) (source Lipton 1983).
20contributes to household income as important factors affecting her empowerment and as such
they are included in the model (Mahmud 1994, Goetz et al  1996,  Hashemi et al 1996).  Moreover
household size (as proxied by the number of adult equivalents) and the proportion of adult
women in the household were also included in order to assess the effect of household
composition on the respondents 'empowerment correlates'. This model was constructed  after a
series of preliminary regressions had been run in order to identify the specification of the
variables in the model as well as to retain a parsimonious number of variables in the final
equation.
Equation 6.0. was estimated, for each of the sixteen 'empowerment correlates'. Given the large
number of estimates involved only the regression coefficients and the predicted probability
estimates of the 'BRAC variables' are reported in tables 11.0 and 12.0.
6.1. Estimating the effect of BRAC on different 'empowerment correlates': the results
The clearest message from the multivariate estimation seems to emerge from the 'asset control'
indicators. The results support the view that greater access to resources in terms of micro-credit
enhances female control (i.e. ability to sell these assets without asking consent) over her assets,
controlling for a range of other factors. Women who have borrowed more than 10000  taka are
26% points more likely to be able to sell poultry independently compared to an identical non-
borrowing member8 A female's control over her jewellery also appears to increase  with loan
size. Borrowers with more than 10000  taka in cumulative loans are twice as likely to be able to
sell their jewellery independently compared to an identical non-borrowing member. 9 A woman's
decision-making power over the use of her savings increases with loan size. The results indicate
that holding other factors constant a woman with more than '10000 taka' in total loans from
BRAC is 16% points more likely to have control over her savings than a non borrowing member
(significant at the 10% level) 30. The BRAC loan coefficients for the 'control over livestock'
regression are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
One can question whether women who have more control over their assets in the first place are
more likely to borrow larger cumulative amounts (i.e. the selectivity bias issue). The literature
suggests that the decision to take increasing amounts of credit is largely a function of membersilip
28 significant at the 1% level.
29 significant at the 10% level
30  Using a non-member as the comparison  group in the savings case would be misleading as access to BRAC savings is
restricted by the organization. This is bome out by the results which show that women from BRAC households
are far more likely to have savings, controlling for other factors, they are also less likely to have independent
control over their savings compared to the relatively smaller number of female non-members who have savings.
21length, the experience with previous loans and the household's repayment capacity  (Mustafa et al
1995, Montgomery et al 1996). There is little evidence to suggest that it is a function of the
amount of control a woman has over her assets. Hence, whilst recognising the possibility of
selectivity bias putting an upward bias on the coefficients of the BRAC loan variables, it is
unlikely that the results are significantly affected.
Table  12.0. indicates that the 'knowledge' variables, appear to be positively influenced by BRAC
membership and BRAC credit, controlling for other factors. For instance, borrowing  more than
10000  taka from BRAC, more than doubles the probability of a woman knowing  the legal way of
divorcing compared to a non-borrowing member 31. A woman with more than ten thousand taka in
cumulative loans is also 10% points more likely to be aware that dowry is illegal than an eligible
non-member but this difference is not significant at the 10% level. The chances of knowing the
local chairman's name is also greater for a BRAC borrower than for non-borrowers  or non-
members. This is significant (at the 5% level) for the less than 5000 taka category and for the
'greater than 1  0000 taka' group. However, the results in the 'knowledge' category are not totally
uni-directional; for instance the probability of women who have borrowed less than 5000 taka and
between 5000-1  0000 taka from BRAC, knowing the legal minimum age of marriage is 7% points
and 6% points (both significant at the 5% level) respectively lower than an eligible non-borrower.
However the 'marriage-age regression' also has the lowest McFadden's R squared value out of
the four 'awareness' indicators (see table 13) which casts some doubt on this result.
Borrowing from BRAC appears to have a mixed impact on female asset ownership.  The
probability of owning poultry is 15% points greater for a non-borrowing member than for a
member with more than 10000  taka t2 in loans controlling for other factors3 3. On the other hand
women who borrow less than 5000 taka are 3% points more likely to own livestocke 4 compared to
a non-borrower. BRAC membership is a highly significant determinant of a woman having
savings. A non-borrowing BRAC member is 41% points more likely to have savings compared to
a non-member 35 and this figure rises steadily with loan size. This is due to BRAC's compulsory
savings requirement.  The other 'empowenrnent' indicators do not provide any significant
insights. For instance the incidence of a woman becoming pregnant against her own wishes varies
3' significant  at the 5% level
32 significant  at the 5%  level
33  It ought to be noted that by the end of 1995, less than  1% of the Matlab RDP Area Office's total loans
disbursed went to poultry rearing activities (Husain et al 1996).
34  significant  at the 10%  level
35  significant  at the 1%  level
22little with BRAC membership or loan size. Being a BRAC member also does not appear to
significantly influence the 'mobility' variablesi 6.
The empirical work in this section supports the view that micro-credit reduces female
vulnerability through two main channels. Firstly it appears that greater amounts of borrowing
enhances a woman's control and decision making power over her assets. The loan threshold after
which the level of asset-control appears to rise significantly is 10000  taka for women in our
Matlab sample. This result is argued to be significant due to the emphasis placed on female
control over assets in both the intra-household bargaining literature and in various studies on
female empowerment.
Secondly the results suggest that there is a positive effect of BRAC's credit on two of the
knowledge/awareness indicators 37 even after controlling for female education variables. Whilst
an obvious limitation of the data is not knowing whether any of the 'knowledge' is actually put
into practice, greater  legal and political awareness is argued to be an important first step towards
raising female consciousness of her rights within the household and in the community at large.
Conclusion
This paper argues that whilst there are several channels by which micro-credit services can reduce
vulnerability there are fewer ways by which it can 'single-handedly' reduce poverty. This is
partly due to the fact that the concept of vulnerability is a somewhat broader one than that of
income-poverty and as such there are more channels by which 'impact'  can be achieved.
However there is more to the story than just definitional differences. Increases in income or
consumption (i.e. reduction in poverty) can occur if credit is used for an income generating
activity and that activity generates returns in excess of the loan installment repayments. However,
in a scenario where the credit-financed investment does not generate a significant net profit then
an asset is created which can reduce vulnerability but will not reduce poverty as the loan
installment repayment takes place through a reduction in consumption and not from the retums to
the investment. A temporary reduction in poverty can also occur  if credit is used for non-
investment purposes such as repaying existing debt, improving housing or social obligations.
However, future consumption will have to be sacrificed to meet repayment obligations. The
empirical evidence in this paper suggests that there may be a threshold cumulative loan size
beyond which micro-credit can make a significant dent on poverty.
36 The exception is the result for the 5000-  10000 taka loan category which suggests that households who have
borrowed in this range are 13% points more likely to visit the local market alone compared to an identical  non-
borrowing member (significant at the 5% level).
37 Aware that dowry is illegal and aware of the local chairman's name
23This paper illustrated the potential reduction in vulnerability due to micro-credit through a
number of pathways. One channel is the asset-creation associated with a series of loan-financed
investments. A household who has taken several loans would typically have focussed its asset-
building on the creation or expansion of one or more income-earning assets and would also have
invested in improving housing conditions. Another channel through which credit reduces
household vulnerability is through income and consumption-smoothing. This occurs through the
creation of non-farm sources of income as well as by saving part of the loan disbursed for the lean
season (Rutherford 1999). Micro-finance services also have an indirect impact on a specific type
of vulnerability, namely the vulnerability faced by women in a patriarchal society. The evidence
in this paper shows that a woman's control over her assets and her knowledge of social issues is
enhanced after borrowing from BRAC's micro-credit program. A fourth pathway by which
micro-finance appears to reduce vulnerability is through the emergency assistance provided by
many micro-finance organizations during periods of acute natural disasters such as the recent
floods in Bangladesh. The fact that these organizations turn into de-facto relief agencies is crucial
in sustaining these households in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster. Moreover the
post-disaster rehabilitation assistance, in terms of both financial and other services. is also highly
valued by micro-credit clients.
There are a number of policy implications that could be drawn from this paper, centering on
issues of program design. The first observation is that the savings collected by organizations like
BRAC could have a greater impact on reducing vulnerability than they currently do. Grameen,
BRAC and ASA (the three largest MFI's) have collected compulsory regular savings from their
clients with a view that the money would act as a de-facto lump sum 'pension' when a client
leaves the organization. Access to these deposits was otherwise limited curtailing a potentially
important source of consumption-smoothing.  Having recognized these limitations there are an
increasing number of MFI's in Bangladesh who have started providing more flexible savings
products including the 'big three' mentioned above. BRAC in 1998 initiated a current account
scheme which is independent of its existing long-term savings system. Now that it has been given
a banking licence8 it is likely to offer a more varied savings package. ASA in 1997 decided to
allow its clients to freely withdraw their savings and the following year opened a savings service
to everyone in the village. Grameen also recently introduced an open access current account
scheme which can be used even by non-members. Depositors earn a competitive market interest
rate and are allowed to withdraw money irrespective of whether they have an outstanding loan or
not. It has to be said, though, that there are issues of prudential regulation and deposit insurance
38 The licence was granted in February 1999
24which need to be thought through carefully as more savings are mobilized by the NGO sector in
Bangladesh.
A second policy implication is that micro-credit may be a more effective remedy against poverty
and vulnerability if it is complemented with other interventions. There are many programs in
Bangladesh which already do so. BRAC operates a micro-credit cum food-relief program 39 for
extremely poor women and an insurance company operates a joint credit and health insurance
program for the poor. These interventions may be especially appropriate for the poorest
households who face the greatest risks of income fluctuations and have the greatest need for a
range of financial and non-financial services and are less inclined to invest in the higher risk
higher return activities that could push them out of poverty.
The issue of complementarity also arises when considering the effect of micro-credit on the
'empowerment'  of women. Whilst the provision of micro-credit can enhance a woman's status in
the eyes of other household members, as she is the source of an important resource, social
mobilization and legal education interventions in conjunction with credit is likely to have a more
significant effect than credit alone.
39  BRAC's  IGVGD program caters to the needs of the most destitute rural women for whom traditional credit programs
are not the answer. This program works with women who are given monthly wheat relief rations, provides
training in homestead poultry rearing and progressively offers concessional loans with a monthly repayment
requirement. These members are gradually absorbed into the mainstream RDP program and offered larger loans.
This mechanism is designed to facilitate the entry of the poorest into regular credit programs and acts as a
transition from a relief to a longer term development program.
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30Appendix I
BRAC - a brief description
BRAC is a non-government organization (NGO) in Bangladesh which was started in 1972 as a
small relief and rehabilitation program in the Sulla district of Sylhet. The organization
experimented with different development philosophies and grew steadily supported by donor
funding" 0. Two parallel programmes 4' merged in 1986 to form what is now BRAC's largest
programme: the Rural Development Programme (RDP).
RDP is a multi-faceted  programme covering over half of Bangladesh's 68,000 villages with
poverty alleviation and empowerment of the rural poor as its main objectives (Chowdhury  et al
1997). RDP's official target group/eligibility criterion 4 2 are households with less than 0.5 acres of
land and whose main occupation involves manual labour for more than one hundred days a year.
One of RDP's  core functions is the delivery of micro-credit in order to promote income and
employment generating opportunities for the poor. RDP is the second largest micro-credit
provider in Bangladesh after the Grameen Bank with around 2.03 million loanees (BRAC 1998).
Another part of RDP' s work involves consciousness-raising activities manifested through its
Human Rights and Legal Education Programme (HRLEP) and through monthly 'Issue Based
Meetings'.
Credit delivery takes place through a network of BRAC local offices who transfer a large part of
the burden of screening borrowers as well as monitoring and enforcing loan contracts to borrower
'groups' (Village Organizations) who accept 'joint-liability' for loan repaymenl 3. Weekly Village
Organization (VO) meetings, held separately for men and women, prove the focal point whereby
savings are collected and loans repaid. Over 90% of VOs are composed of females in BRAC.
RDP has two approaches to micro-enterprise development; the 'minimalist' versus the
'integrated/sector program approach'. Around 75% of BRAC's lending portfolio is composed of
individual loans, similar to other 'minimalist' credit operations, where loans are disbursed without
40 Donor  confidence  in BRAC's  management  grew  considerably  following  the organization's  extraordinary
achievement  in  reaching  thirteen  million  households  by 1990  in Bangladesh  with its Oral  Rehydration  Therapy
Extension  Programme  (Chowdhury  et al 1996).
41 Outreach and the Rural Credit and Training Project
42 The terms 'target group' (TG) and 'eligible' will be used interchangeably throughout this document
43 BRAC has 'small-groups' composed of around five to seven individuals within the VO in order for 'peer-monitoring'
to take place. However the extent that loans get recovered through small-group peer monitoring in micro-credit
programs has been questioned (Matin 1997). The atmosphere of mutual trust and reciprocity between lender and
loanee, the individual incentive to access larger amounts of credit in the future and intense staff monitoring of
individual loan use are also critical factors behind the remarkably high overall repayment rates of micro-credit
loans (Jain 1996).
31any complementary inputs (BRAC 1997). In the 'integrated' approach selective skills training,
technical assistance and marketing interventions are provided in addition to credit. RDP provides
an 'integrated' service in six sectors namely poultry, livestock, fisheries, social forestry, vegetable
cultivation and sericulture. For instance BRAC emphasises vaccination support for its poultry,
livestock and fisheries loanees. A key feature of the 'integrated approach' is training on a range
of micro-enterprise management issues and specific technical skills training. Marketing support is
also provided in a vertical chain with BRAC acting as the intermediary between different sets of
loanees who are involved at various stages of the production cycle particularly in the poultry,
fisheries and sericulture programmes (with urban retail outlets for silk and handicraft products). It
hias  to be noted that these two approaches can coexist with each other in the same village; a
member can either have taken a 'sectoral' loan or a 'minimalist' loan at any point in time.
BRAC also mobilizes savings from its clients. A minimum of five taka has to be deposited each
week. The levels of savings that have to be maintained in order to borrow are 5%, 10%. 15% and
20% for the first, second, third and fourth (and beyond) loans respectively. The original idea
behind accumulating savings was that it would benefit both BRAC and its clients.  The benefit to
BRAC was in terms of the savings acting as a collateral substitute and as a source of funds for on-
lending. Savings withdrawals were restricted in the past on the basis that the main benefit to
BRAC's clients would be to take their entire savings when they left BRAC, as a de-facto lump
sum pension. However, in light of BRAC's experimentation with more flexible withdrawal
systems BRAC management has recently decided to allow current accounts to be established at
BRAC branches (with minimum 50 taka deposit and withdrawal) whilst still retaining the
compulsory savings system. Table 1.0. summarizes the key statistics relevant to BRAC's micro-
credit program
BRAC's two other main programs are the Non Formal Primary Education Programme (NFPE)
which currently operates around 34,000 schools and the Health and Population Programme (HPP)
which has an overall outreach of nearly ten million people (BRAC 1997). BRAC has a full time
employee size of over twelve thousand, with only three hundred at head office. These summary
statistics may give some idea of the scale of BRAC's operations and its decentralized nature.
RDP, the program which includes BRAC's credit activities, is the largest of the three main
programmes in terms of size, coverage and budget.
32Appendix 2: Measuring impact: the problems of fungibility, the counterfactual and
selectivity
Assessing the impact of an anti-poverty intervention such as micro-credit suffers from three
major methodological problems which we now turn to.
The problem of the counterfactual
This problem is to do with evaluating what the welfare levels would be if the anti-poverty
program did not exist. This issue is one of the most difficult methodological problems in
evaluating micro-credit programs (Yaron et al 1997) and anti-poverty programs in general
(Ravallion 1991). The literature generally uses control groups to tackle the problem of the
counter-factual (Evans et al 1995, Khandker op.cit., Montgomery et al 1995,  Mustafa et al 1996).
Montgomery et al's (op.cit) study of RDP's impact revolves around comparing households who
have borrowed more than three times and those who have borrowed once from BRAC with
households who are recent members and have not borrowed acting as the control group. The
authors recognize that using this control group has its shortcomings as the newer members are
better off than older members in terms of 'initial endowment'.
Another suggestion in the literature is to have an appropriate model of State intervention in order
to find a counterfactual for NGO programs (Besley 1997). However, Besley (op.cit) also
recognizes that there are sections of the poor that the Government do not reach and as such this
counterfactual may be unrealistic in practice. The micro-credit system in Bangladesh reflects this
scenario; the formal financial system has had limited success in targeting the poor with the
notable exception of BRDB's RD-  12 project (Khandker 1998). A more appropriate
counterfactual, however, is to question whether the household would have been able to access
other forms of social support through informal networks or obtain micro-credit from other NGOs.
In this paper, the problem of the counterfactual is addressed by using two different control groups
(eligible non member and non-borrowing member) and using 'membership in other NGOs' as an
independent variable.
The fungibility of money
BRAC lends to individuals who claim they will invest the money in specific income generating
projects. There is no questioning the fact that not all the money borrowed from BRAC is used for
'investment purposes'. Money is fungible and often the cash obtained from BRAC is used for on-
lending, for immediate consumption needs, to repay loans as well as to invest in an income
generating activity.
33The problem that this poses for any work on the impact of credit on household welfare is that the
same loan amount could be disbursed to two women who use it in very different ways. One
woman may use the bulk of the money to meet a household crisis and another may invest it in an
asset which generates long terrn returns. This is a problem for which no easy answer exists.
The best one can do is rely on the law of averages with large data sets and use existing evidence
which shows that about 80% of credit disbursed by BRAC is invested in an income generating
activity by the borrowing household (Mustafa et al 1996). BRAC field officials discuss the
feasibility of the project with the loan applicant and once the loan is granted BRAC staff often
informally monitor whether the bulk of the money was invested in the proposed project or not.
The borrowers know that if they use a large portion of the loan for a totally unrelated purpose
then they will face problems in accessing further BRAC credit.
The discussion in this chapter will not be based on the premise that taka 'x' was borrowed,
invested entirely in project 'y'  and that this led to a  'z'  taka change in consumption. The line of
argument will instead be that taka 'x'  was borrowed, it was spent by a utilitv maximizing
household and that controlling for other factors one can roughly attribute 'z'  taka change in
consumption to this loan.
The 'selectivity problem'
Evaluating the effect of an institution (e.g. a trade union or an anti-poverty program) on an
outcome variable (e.g. wages or living standards) using regression analysis can lead to biased
estimates if the underlying process which governs 'selection'  into the institution is not
incorporated in the empirical framework. The reason for this is that the effect of say the anti-
poverty program may be over (under) estimated if program participants are more (less) able, due
to certain unobservable characteristics, to derive these benefits compared to eligible non-
participants.
One solution to this problem in econometric analysis is the use of the Heckman two-step
procedure. The first stage models a 'participation equation', which attempts to capture the factors
governing membership in a program. This equation is used to construct a selectivity term known
as the 'Mills ratio' which is added to the second stage 'outcome'  equation. If the coefficient of the
'selectivity'  term is significant then the hypothesis that the participation equation is governed by
an unobservable selection process is confirmed; moreover, with the inclusion of the extra term,
the coefficients in the second stage 'selectivity corrected' equation are unbiased. However, if the
coefficient of the selectivity term is insignificant, OLS estimates can safely be used for the model.
Coulombe et al (1996) estimate poverty in Mauritania using this two-stage procedure. First they
estimate the probability that a household will belong to a particular occupational group and then
34they estimate separate welfare regressions for the different groups. Their rationale is that the
determinants of poverty will differ between the socio-economic groups (e.g. land ownership is
more important for agricultural households) and that the extent of poverty is also determined by
the household's occupational group.
However a major problem in practice with the Heckman procedure is that of identification,
similar to the problem faced when using the instrumental variables (IV) technique. The first
equation must be influenced by at least one variable that is not a significant determinant  of the
second-stage outcome equation. This identification variable is not easy to find. Ravallion et al
(1997b) model the gains to a farm household in Bangladesh from switching to a non-farm
occupation where the first stage is the 'occupational selection' equation and the second is the
welfare equation. The variables used for identification are household life-cycle variables  as the
authors postulate that the '...stage of the life cycle is an important determinant of mobility across
sectors within the rural economy but is of little consequence to consumption wvithin  sectors' (pp.
9). In another paper, Ravallion et al (1997a) suggest using  '...years of schooling in one case and
degree obtained in the other' (pp. 4) in order to obtain identification for a Heckman procedure.
However this is by no means a 'first best' solution to the problem given that both variables are
likely to have a similar influence on both outcome variables. Reilly (1990) mentions the
possibility of obtaining identification by exploiting the fact that the Mills ratio term is a non-
linear function of the exogenous variables used in the first stage equation. Hence, all the variables
in the first stage equation can enter the second stage, along with the Mills ratio term, in order to
identify the selectivity effect. This 'identification on functional formn'  procedure is normally used
to test for the sensitivity of the estimates from the Heckman procedure to the particular
identification variable used. Since identification in this case is obtained 'technically' and not with
a theoretically-based identification term, this type of 'identification on functional form' is
generally viewed as a second-best way of using the Heckman procedure.
Khandker (1996) addressed the 'selectivity problem' using an econometric technique that had as
its basis the assumption that households with more than 0.5 acres of land are not included in
micro-credit programs. Khandker's view was that there were no suitable identiufying  instruments
which would permit the use of techniques such as the Heckman procedure. However the 'half an
acre restriction' has its limitations given that a sizeable proportion of credit programs in
Bangladesh include members who do not fulfil this land criterion as chapter two and various
other studies have indicated (Mustafa et al 1996, Montgomery et al 1996).
35Appendix  3 The data  for the female  empowerment  analysis
At the outset one must stress the importance of anthropological techniques in measuring
subjective concepts such as 'empowerment'. There is generally a trade-off between the
'representative nature' of large sample surveys and detailed case study/participatory approaches
in rural research. My analysis will primarily be using the former method due to the detailed depth
of the Matlab 'female questionnaire' which elicited information on various dimensions of
women's  lives. The questions were divided into several sections including 'ownership and control
over assets',  'general and legal knowledge', 'fertility'  and 'mobility'.
In terms of ownership and control over resources a list of common household assets was
presented and the woman was asked whether she owned the items herself, if so whether she could
sell them of her own accord, if she could keep the proceeds from the sale and whether the latter
actually ever happened. The legal and political knowledge section focussed on the woman's
awareness regarding dowry, marriage age, divorce and 'union parishad' chairman's (local elected
representative) name. The 'fertility'  section probed into issues such as whether the woman
decided to have a child (in conjunction with her husband) or whether it was due entirely to her
husband's, or even mother-in-law's, will. The mobility section lists a number of sites in the
locality such as the marketplace and questions whether the female has visited these places in the
last four months and if so whether she went alone or not.
Female interviewers were hired for the survey and trained by the Matlab project's core
researchers. The responses were precoded; a typical example is the general knowledge section
where interviewers ticked off 'correct', 'incorrect'  or 'don't  know' boxes. Sixteen 'empowerment
correlates'  were developed from the responses to these questions. All of these 'empowerment
correlates'  are binary variables4 with the value one for 'yes'  and zero for 'no'. It was decided not
to construct 'empowerment'  indices of any sort due to the problem of assigning subjective
weights to different responses. Whilst Hashemi et al (1996) used an index of empowerment for
their work, their weights were based on the authors' in-depth knowledge of the households in
their sample villages based on two years of prior anthropological research. This paper prefers to
assess all sixteen indicators separately and then come to some general conclusions on the effect of
BRAC on different aspects of empowerment. The final sample used is 1568  women out of which
379 were BRAC members and 1189 non members.
44 The responses were transformed into binary variables where necessary; for instance in the 'general knowledge'
example discussed above, the 'incorrect' and 'don't know' responses were merged into one category.
36Table 1.0. BRAC's  credit  programs' basic  statistics  (Dec.  98)
Membership  Borrowers  Cumulative  Total  Disbursement Total
disbursement  outstanding  1998  savings
2.76  2.03  $625.9  $108.9  $174.5  $46.6
million  million  million  million  million  million
Table 2.0: Socio-economic characteristics of BRAC members and membership length
Length of membership  Differences in means
and proportions (5%
significance)
Column number  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Column differences
1-10  11-20  21-30  31-40  vs.  vs.  vs.  vs.
months  months  months  months  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
(n=79)  (n=127)  (n=231)  (n=110)
Land owned in decimals  54.9  48.9  31.4  27.2  4  4  1,2
Value of non land assets (tk.)  29221  26222  19886  31716  3  3  1,2,4  3
Total savings (tk.)  2137  3759  4408  6331  3.4  1  1
Earners to household size  0.23  0.23  0.21  0.22
ratio
Dependency ratio*  0.32  0.31  0.35  0.29  2,4  3
Age of household head  47.5  44.2  43.8  43.2  3,4  1  1
Female headed household %  8.9  13.4  15.1  10.0
Average education in  2.02  2.08  1.35  1.87  3  3  1,2,4  3
household in years
Education of household head  2.43  2.90  1.43  2.5  3  3  1,2,4  3
in years
Manual labourer household  25.3  29.1  26.8  17.3  4  4  2,3
head %
Note: The 'column  differences'  represent  the significant  (5% level)  mean  differences  between  one  category
and another  for each variable.  For instance  columns  (1)  and (2) are significantly  different  in terms  of
moderate  poverty  at the 5% level.
Source:  Zaman  (1998)
37Table 3.0.: Variables definitions for 'poverty models'
Variable  Definition
LGCOAD  Log of total consumption per adult equivalent
LGLAND  quantity of land owned (log)
AGHHH  age of the household head in years
AGHSQ  age of the household head squared
AG I 560M  number of adult males in the household (aged 15-60)
AGI56OF  number of adult females in the household (aged 15-60)
OTHNGO  I if household member of other NGO, 0 if not
HHHLBR  I if household head is a manual labourer, 0 if not
ADEQPR  ratio of the number of adult equivalents to household size
DEPEND  number aged under ten plus those over sixty, divided by total members
EARNER  ratio of earners to household size
HHHLBR  I if household head is a manual labourer, zero if not
HLTHHH  1 if household head is in good health, zero if not
PRIMHHH  1if household head attended primary school; zero if not
SECHHH  I if household head attended secondary school, zero if not
SXHHH  1 if household head is male, zero if female
BRVO  I if household is BRAC member, 0 if not
MLOADUM1  i if household has more than ten decimals of land and has borrowed less than
5000 taka, 0 if not
MLOADUM2  1 if household has more than ten decimals of land and has borrowed between
5000-10,000 taka, 0 if not
MLOADUM3  1 if household has more than ten decimals of land and has borrowed more
than 10000  taka, 0 if not
ULOADUM1  1 if household has less than ten decimals of land and has borrowed less than
5000 taka, 0 if not
ULOADUM2  1 if household has less than ten decimals of land and has borrowed between
5000-1000  taka, 0 if not
ULOADUM3  I if household has less than ten decimals of land and has borrowed more than
10000 taka, 0 if not
MEMLENI  I if membership length between 1-10 months, 0 if not
MEMLEN2  I if membership length between 11-20 months, 0 if not
38MEMLEN3  I if membership length between 21-30 months, 0 if not
MEMLEN4  I if membership length between 31-40 months, 0 if not
IEMBNK  I if village is inside embankment, 0 if not
MARKET  Distance from market in kms.
TGHH92  Number of eligible households in village in 1992
VIL I  Uddamdi
VIL2  Nilokhi








LAMBDA  Mills ratio term
39Table 4.0.: Estimated coefficients of the 'BRAC variables' in poverty models (n=1072)
Identification  Identification  Identification on  OLS with
with TGHH92  on functional  functional form  village
(eq. 3.1.)  form with  with village  dummies
TGHH92  dummies  (eq. 3.4.)
(eq. 3.2.)  (eq. 3.3.)
BRVO  0.07  -0.76  -0.83  -0.05
(p = 0.72)  (p  0.10)  (p = 0.05)  (p=0.37)
MLOADUMI  0.07  0.08
(p = 0.41)  (p =0.38)
MLOADUM2  -0.01  -0.01
(p = 0.91)  (p = 0.95)
MLOADUM3  0.17  0.18
(p = 0.05)  (p = 0.06)
ULOADUMI  0.01  0.02
(p = 0.91)  (p=0.  88)
ULOADUM2  0.05  0.06
(p = 0.56)  (p=0.55)
ULOADUM3  0.14  0.14
(p= 0 12)  (p=O. 13)
MEMLENGI  0.13  0.13
(p = 0.08)  (p = 0.1 1)
MEMLENG2  0.09  0.09
(p = 0.20)  (p = 0.23)
MEMLENG3  0.04  0.04
(p = 0.59)  (p = 0.62)
MEMLENG4  0.09  0.09
(p = 0.21)  (p = 0.26)
Lambda  -0.01  0.50  0.47
(p = 0.97)  (0.07)  (p = 0.06)
40Table 5.0.: Detailed regression results for equation 3.3
Mean  Standard  equation 3.3
Deviation
Variables
HLTHHH  0.83  0.38  0.05
AG156OF  1.39  0.74  0.04
AG1560M  1.29  0.86  -0.01
SXHHH  0.85  0.36  -0.03
HHHLBR  0.29  0.45  -0.13***
BRVO  0.49  0.50  -0.82*
DEPEND  0.33  0.21  -0.18
EARNER  0.24  0.15  0.38
ADEQPR  0.82  0.07  -1.23***
PRIMHHH  0.23  0.42  0.02
OTHNGO  0.16  0.37  -0.08
SECHHH  0.13  0.34  0.14***
AGHHH  44.0  13.0  -0.01*
AGHSQ  2101.7  1257.1  0.00
LGLAND  2.31  1.44  0.07***
IEMBNK  0.52  0.50
MARKET  225.56  122.1
MLOADUMI  0.07  0.33  0.07
MLOADUM2  0.13  0.41  -0.01
MLOADUM3  0.05  0.32  0.17*
ULOADUMI  0.05  0.23  0.11
ULOADUM2  0.07  0.26  0.05
ULOADUM3  0.07  0.25  0.14
MEMLENI  0.05  0.21  0.13  *
MEMLEN2  0.09  0.28  0.09
MEMLEN3  0.19  0.39  0.04
MEMLEN4  0.09  0.28  0.08
VIL2  0.03  0.17  0.14
VIL3  0.05  0.22  0.06
VIL4  0.17  0.38  -0.12
VIL5  0.13  0.33  0.18***
VIL6  0.07  0.25  0.12
VIL7  0.46  0.21  0.15*
VIL8  0.08  0.27  0.18**
VIL9  0.06  0.23  0.15**
VILIO  0.22  0.42  -0.06
Lambda  0.47*
R squared  0.21
*** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
41Table 6.0. Monthly 'On Time Repayment' rates for BRAC's credit program
Including Arrears +  Excluding Advances  Excluding Arrears +
Advances  Advances
July 1998  122%  99.6%  92%
August 1998  92%  78%  77%
September 1998  73%  62%  61%
October 1998  94%  77%  74%
November 1998  92%  79%
December 1998  95%  83%
42Table 7.0. Loan amount and use by ten BRAC clients in Matlab region, Bangladesh
Case  15t  loan (main  2nd loan  3ra Joan  45 loan  - n  Jon  loan
use)  _  ______  _ _
1  l 000tk (fish  2000tk  6000tk (house
trading)  (farming  repair after 1998
costs)  floods)
2  3000tk (house  6000tk  6000 (house
repair)  (bought bed)  repair)
3  lOOOtk  (boat  2000tk (fish  4000 tk  5000tk (land  6000 tk
repair)  trading)  (vegetable  mortgaged in)  (house
cultivation)  repair after
flood)
4  3000tk  5000tk  8000tk(expanded  10000  tk
(expanded  (expanded  grocery shop)  (repaired
existing  grocery shop)  shop)
grocery shop)  .
5  lOOOtk  (fish  3000tk (fish  6000tk (land  8000tk (house
trading)  trading)  mortgaged in)  repair after
flood)
6  2500tk  4000tk  6000 tk (repaid
(medical  (farming  another  bank
expenses)  costs)  loan)
7  2500tk  6000tk  8000tk (expanded  lOOOOtk  (part-
(expanded  (expanded  grocery shop  financed new
grocery shop  grocery shop  stock)  transport boat)
stock)  stock)
8  1  500tk (gave  2500tk (gave  3000tk (bought  4000tk (used  5000tk  4000tk
husband, no  husband, no  tin for house  for household  (potato  (household
idea of loan  idea of loan  roof)  consumption)  cultivation)  consumptio
use)  use)  n during
floods)
9  1000 tk  l500tk  2000tk (paddy  3000tk (paddy  4000tk  lOOOOtk
(expanded and  (bought tin  cultivation)  cultivation)  (paddy  (house
renovated  for house)  cultivation)  repair)
existing shop)
10  1000 tk (house  I 500tk (tin  2SOOtk  (vegetable  4000tk  8000tk  4000tk (for
repair)  for roof)  cultivation)  (vegetable  (materials  flood
cultivation)  for new  repair)
housing
unit)
43Table 7 (cont.): Loan amounts and use in Manikanj region, Bangladesh
_  I St  2"l  3r  46  5th  6  7th
II  4000tk gave  6000 tk
it to son - (same as







13  4000 tk  8000 tk
(village  (village
restaurant)  restaurant)  __  __
14  O000  tk  4000 tk
(bought  (repaired
cow)  house)
15  3000 tk  7000 tk  10000  7000
(grocery  (grocery  (grocery  (housing
shop)  shop)  shop)  loan)
16  3000 tk  4000 tk  6000 tk  8000 tk  7000 tk  10000
(poultry  (expanded  (sweet  (sweet  (housing  tk
investment)  existing  shop)  shop)  loan)  (sweet
sweet  shop)
shop)
17  2000 tk  7000 tk  10000  tk  10000 tk  10000
(carpentry  (housing  (cow  (paid off  tk
tools for  loan)  purchase)  mother's  (poultry
sons)  moneylen  rearing)
ders  loan)
18  3000 tk (fish  6000 tk  7000 tk  8000 tk
net)  (fish  (fish  (fish
_  trading)  trading)  trading)
19  2000 tk  4000 tk  8000 tk
(house  (poultry  (poultry
repair)  business)  business)
20  3000 tk  S000tk  8000tk  10000tk
(expanded  (house  (grocery  (grocery
existing  repair)  shop)  shop)
grocery
shop)  _
44Table 8.0. Membership length and asset accumulation for BRAC members
1-11 months  12-47 months  48+ months
% houses with tin  46.1  60.1**  63.3**
roofs
Productive non-land  5376  5293  7023**
assets
Source:  Husain  (ed. 1998)
*  significant  difference  from (1-I1)  month  category  at 5% level
Table 9.0: Monthly profit rates for seven 'BRAC loan activities' in Matlab (in taka)
Monthly  accounting  profit  Monthly  economic profit
Grocery shop  1883  589
Net making  1808  1036
Poultry  1296  1224
Potato cultivation  1106  1074
Paddy cultivation  75  68
Goat rearing  22  22
Bull fattening  -104  -128
Note: When  calculating  economic  profit  the opportunity  cost of additional  investment  in the project  is
included  for all activities.  The opportunity  cost  of time is only  calculated  for potato  and paddy  cultivation,
net making  and grocery  shop
Source:  Zaman  et al (1995)
45Table 10.0 Variabfe definitions for the 'empowerment correlates' model
Variable  Definition
Household
LANDEQ  quantity of land owned per adult equivalent in decimals
AGHHH  age of the household head in years
AVED  mean years of education in household
ADULEQ  number of adult equivalent members in household
PROPWO  proportion in household who are female aged 15-60
IHHHLBR  dummy variable; I if household head is a manual labourer, 0 if not
Female specific
CONWOM  dummy variable; 1 if woman contributes to household income, 0 if not
MARWOM  I if woman is married, 0 if divorced, abandoned, widowed, separated  or
widowed
AGEWOM  age of female
EDUWOM  number of years of education of ever married woman
HLTHWOM  I if woman is in 'self-assessed' good health, 0 if not
BRAC specific
BRVO  1 if household is BRAC member, 0 if not
LOADUM1  1 if BRAC member and no loan; zero if not
LOADUM2  1 if borrowed less than 5000 taka from BRAC, zero if not
LOADUM3  1 if borrowed between 5000-10,000 taka from BRAC; zero if not













V1 2  Shanaterkandhi
V13  Shabazkhandi
V14  Sharkarpur
46Table 11.0 Coefficient estimates of BRAC variables in 'empowerment correlates models' (n
=  1568 except for the categories indicated)
BRVO  LOADUMI  LOADUM2  LOADUM3
Aware that dowry is illegal  0.033  -0.001  0.047  0.077
Aware of method of divorce  -0.006  -0.01  0.007  0.045**
Aware of minimum marriage age  0.036  -0.076**  -0.064**  0.008
Aware of local chairman's name  0.021  0.160**  0.089  0.123**
Owns land  0.112**  0.036  0.106*  0.058
Owns poultry  0.121***  -0.094  -0.133**  -0.144**
If owns poultry % that can sell  -0.103*  0.048  -0.007  0.245***
poultry independently (n = 980)
Owns livestock  -0.046*  0.058*  0.036  0.046
If owns livestock % that can sell  -0.178  -0.021  0.094  -0.265
livestock independently (n
103)
Owns jewelry  0.08*  -0.014  -0.093  -0.089
If owns jewelry % that can sell  0.017  0.032  0.011  0.079*
jewelry  independently (n = 694)
Has savings  0.473***  0.086*  0.110**  0.118***
If has savings % can use savings  -0.345***  0.085  0.064  0.151*
independently (n = 379)
Forced pregnancy  0.004  -0.035*  -0.006  -0.001
Visits local market  -0.037  0.084  0.097**  0.029
Visits Matlab market  -0.038  0.037  0.026  0.007
significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level * significant at the 1% level
47Table 12.0.  Predicted  probabilities  of the impact  of BRAC's  credit  on selected
'empowerment  correlates'  (n = 1568  except  for the categories  indicated)




Empowerment correlates  <5000  5000-  > 10000
10000
Aware that dowry is illegal  0.73  0.76  0.76  0.80  0.83
Aware of divorce law  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.08
Aware of minimum marriage age  0.06  0.10  0.03  0.04  0.11
Aware of local chairman's name  0.51  0.53  0.70  0.62  0.67
Owns land  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.04
Owns poultry  0.62  0.75  0.65  0.60  0.58
If owns poultry % that can sell poultry  0.67  0.56  0.62  0.56  0.82
independently (n=980)
Owns livestock  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.07
If owns livestock % that can sell  0.67  0.47  0.45  0.55  0.25
livestock independently (n = 103)
Owns jewellery  0.44  0.52  0.51  0.42  0.43
If owns jewellery %  that can sell  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.16
jewellery independently (n = 694)
Has savings  0.11  0.52  0.61  0.64  0.66
If has savings % that can use savings  0.80  0.46  0.54  0.53  0.62
independently (n=3  79)
Forced pregnancy  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02
Visits local market  0.19  0.14  0.13  0.27  0.17
Visits Matlab market  0.14  0.11  0.14  0.14  0.12
48Table 13.0 Goodness of fit statistics for the 'empowerment correlates models'
Maximum  Maximum  McFadden's
likelihood  likelihood  R squared
(restricted)  (unrestricted)
Aware that dowry is illegal  -883.9  -770.3  0.13
Aware of method of divorce  -218.0  -171.3  0.21
Aware of minimum marriage age  -374.7  -340.8  0.09
Aware of local chairman's name  -1082.6  -947.9  0.12
Owns land  -261.0  -250.6  0.04
Owns poultry  -1037.3  -947.5  0.09
If owns poultry % that can sell poultry  -624.7  -590.0  0.05
independently
Owns livestock  -380.0  -349.6  0.08
If owns livestock % that can sell livestock  -69.3  -51.5  0.26
independently
Owns jewellery  -1076.5  -962.2  0.11
If owns jewellery % that can sell jewellery  -184.7  -121.3  0.34
independently
Has savings  -867.2  -575.4  0.34
If has savings % can use savings  -251.7  -216.0  0.14
independently
Forced pregnancy  -171.4  -142.3  0.17
Visits local market  -764.0  -647.0  0.15
Visits Matlab market  -626.7  -562.9  0.11
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